That to do our duty in part is better than entirely to disregard it, cannot be denied; and he that avoids some crimes, from the fear of displeasing God, is doubtless far more innocent than he that has thrown off all restraint, has forgotten the distinctions of good and evil, and complies with every temptation. But it is a very dangerous mistake, to conceive that any man, by obeying one law, acquires the liberty of breaking another; or that all sins, equally odious to God, or hurtful to men, are not, with equal care, to be avoided.

We may frequently observe, that men, who would abhor the thought of violating the property of another, by direct methods of oppression or rapine, men, on all common occasions, not only just, but kind and compassionate, willing to relieve the necessitous, and active in the protection of the injured, will nevertheless invade the characters of others with defamation and calumny, and destroy a reputation without remorse.

If every day did not convince us, how little either good or bad men are consistent with themselves, it might be wondered, how men, who own their obligations to the practice of some duties, can overlook in themselves the omission of others equally important, and enjoined by the same authority; and that those who avoid theft, because they are forbidden to steal, do not equally abstain from calumny, since they are no less forbidden “to bear false witness against their neighbour”; a prohibition, of which I shall endeavour to explain the nature, and enforce the necessity, by shewing,

First, what are the different senses, in which a man may be said “to bear false witness against his neighbour.”

Secondly, the enormity of the sin of “bearing false witness.”

Thirdly, what reflections may best enable us to avoid it.

The highest degree of guilt forbidden by this law of God, is false testimony in a literal sense, or deliberate and solemn perjury in a court of justice, by which the life of an innocent man is taken away, the rightful owner stripped of his possessions, or an oppressour supported in his usurpations. This is a crime that includes robbery and murder, sublimed2 to the highest state of enormity, and heightened with the most atrocious aggravations. He that robs or murders by this method, not only does it, by the nature of the action, with calmness and premeditation, but by making the name of God a sanction to his wickedness. Upon this it is unnecessary to dwell long, since men, arrived at this height of corruption, are scarcely to be reformed by argument, or persuasion; and indeed seldom suffer themselves to be reasoned with, or admonished. It may be however proper to observe, that he who is ever so remotely the cause of any wickedness, if he really designs, and willingly promotes it, is guilty of that action in the same, or nearly the same, degree with the immediate perpetrator; and therefore he that suborns a false witness, or procures such a one to be suborned, whether in his own cause, or in that of another, is guilty of the crime of perjury in its utmost extent.

Nor is that man only perjured, who delivers for truth what he certainly knows to be false; but he likewise that asserts what he does not know to be true. For as an oath taken implies, in the opinion of the magistrate who administers it, a knowledge of the fact required to be proved, he that, by offering himself as an evidence, declares himself acquainted with what he is ignorant of, is guilty of bearing false witness, since, though what he swears should happen to be true, it is not true that he knew it.

Such remarks as these seem, at the first view, very trifling, because they are obvious, and yet are made necessary by the conduct of mankind. Every man almost has had opportunities of observing, with what gross and artless delusions men impose upon themselves, how readily they distinguish between actions, in the eye of justice and of reason, equally criminal; how often they hope to elude the vengeance of heaven, by substituting others to perpetrate the villainies they contrive; how often they mock God by groundless excuses; and how often they voluntarily shut their eyes, to leap into destruction.

There is another sense in which a man may be said to “bear false witness against his neighbour,” a lower degree of the crime forbidden in the text, a degree, in which multitudes are guilty of it; or, rather, from which scarcely any are entirely free. He, that attacks the reputation of another by calumny, is doubtless, according to the malignity of the report, chargeable with the breach of this commandment.

Yet this is so universal a practice, that it is scarcely accounted criminal, or numbered among those sins which require repentance. Defamation is become one of the amusements of life, a cursory part of conversation and social entertainment. Men sport away the reputation of others, without the least reflection upon the injury which they are doing, and applaud the happiness of their own invention, if they can increase the mirth of a feast, or animate conviviality, by slander and detraction.

How it comes to pass, that men do not perceive the absurdity of distinguishing in such a manner between themselves and others, as to conceive that conduct innocent in themselves, which, in others, they would make no difficulty of condemning, it is not easy to tell. Yet it is apparent, that every man is sufficiently sensible, when his own character is attacked, of the cruelty and injustice of calumny; and it is no less evident, that those will animadvert, with all the wantonness of malice, upon the moral irregularities of others, whom the least reflection upon their own lives kindles into fury, and exasperates to the utmost severities of revenge.

To invent a defamatory falsehood, to rack the invention for the sake of disguising it with circumstances of probability, and propagate it industriously, till it becomes popular, and takes root in the minds of men, is such a continued act of malice, as nothing can palliate.

Nor will it be a sufficient vindication to alledge, that the report, though not wholly, yet in part is true, and that it was no unreasonable suspicion that suggested the rest. For, if suspicion be admitted for certainty, every man’s happiness must be entirely in the power of those bad men, whose consciousness of guilt makes them easily judge ill of others,3 or whom a natural, or habitual jealousy inclines to imagine frauds or villainies, where none are intended. And if small failings may be aggravated at the pleasure of the relater, who may not, however cautious, be made infamous and detestable? A calumny, in which falsehood is complicated with truth, and malice is assisted by probability, is more dangerous, but therefore less innocent, than unmixed forgery, and groundless invectives.

Neither is the first authour only of a calumny a “false witness against his neighbour,” but he likewise that disseminates and promotes it; since, without his assistance, it would perish as soon as it is produced, would evaporate in the air without effect, and hurt none but him that uttered it. He that blows a fire for the destruction of a city, is no less an incendiary than he that kindled it. And the man that imagines he may, without a crime, circulate a calumny which he has received from another, may, with equal reason, conceive, that though it be murder to prepare poisons, it may be innocent to disperse them.

Many are the pleas and excuses, with which those, who cannot deny this practice, endeavour to palliate it. They frequently assert, in their own justification, that they do not know the relation, which they hand about, to be false. But to those it may be justly replied, that before they spread a report to the prejudice of others, they ought, if not to know that it is true, at least to believe it upon some reasonable grounds. They ought not to assist a random whisper, or drive forward a flying tale;4 they ought not eagerly to catch at an opportunity of hurting, or add weight to a blow which may perhaps be undeserved.

It may happen indeed, that a calumny may be supported by such testimony, and connected with such probabilities, as may deceive the circumspect and just; and the reporter, in such cases, is by no means to be charged with bearing false witness; because to believe and disbelieve is not in our power; for there is a certain degree of evidence, to which a man cannot but yield. He, therefore, who is deceived himself, cannot be accused of deceiving others, and is only so far blameable, as he contributed to the dishonour or prejudice of another, by spreading his faults without any just occasion, or lawful cause.5 For to relate reproachful truths, only for the pleasure of depressing the reputation of our neighbour, is far from being innocent.6 The crime indeed doth not fall under the head of calumny, but only differs from it in the falsehood, not in the malice.

There is another occasion made use of, by which, if this fault could escape from censure, many others might enjoy the same advantage. It is urged by some, that they do not adopt the tale, ’till it is generally received, and only promote what they cannot hinder. But how must wickedness be controuled, if its prevalence be a reason for compliance? Is it equitable and just to coalesce with oppressors, because they are already too powerful for the injured to resist? Thus any man might vindicate rebellion, by affirming that he did not join with the rebels, ’till they were already numerous enough to dethrone their prince. Thus a man may exempt himself from blame, for betraying his trust, and selling his country, by alledging that others had already sold it, and he only entered into the combination, that he might share the reward of perfidy. But it requires few arguments to shew the folly of such pleas as these. It is the duty of every man to regulate his conduct, not by the example of others, or by his own surmises, but by the invariable rules of equity and truth. Wickedness must be opposed by some, or virtue would be entirely driven out of the world. And who must oppose it in extremities, if, as it increases more, it be less criminal to yield without resistance? If this excuse will vindicate one man, it will vindicate another; and no man will be found, who is obliged to maintain a post, from which others may fly without a crime, and to endeavour to reform the world, by which it is no reproach to be vitiated. If this reasoning were just, there might be a state of general depravity, in which wickedness might lose its guilt, since every man might be led away by predominant corruption, and the universality of vice become its own defence.

In such a situation indeed, there is a necessity for an uncommon firmness and resolution to persist in the right, without regard to ridicule on the one hand, or interest on the other. But this resolution must be summoned; we must call up all our strength, and awaken all our caution, and in defiance of iniquity, however warranted by fashion, or supported by power, maintain an unshaken integrity, and reproach the world by a good example, if we cannot amend it.

There is yet another way, by which we may partake, in some measure, of the sin of “bearing false witness.” That he, who does not hinder the commission of a crime, involves himself in the guilt, cannot be denied; and that his guilt is yet more flagrant, if, instead of obstructing, he encourages it, is equally evident.7 He therefore that receives a calumny with applause, or listens to it with a silent approbation, must be at least chargeable with conniving at wrong, which will be found no trivial accusation, when we have considered, Secondly, the enormity of the sin of “bearing false witness.”

The malignity of an offence arises, either from the motives that prompted it,8 or the consequences produced by it.

If we examine the sin of calumny by this rule, we shall find both the motives and consequences of the worst kind. We shall find its causes and effects concurring to distinguish it from common wickedness, and rank it with those crimes that pollute the earth, and blacken human nature.

The most usual incitement to defamation is envy, or impatience of the merit, or success, of others; a malice raised not by any injury received, but merely by the sight of that happiness which we cannot attain. This is a passion, of all others most hurtful and contemptible; it is pride complicated with laziness; pride which inclines us to wish ourselves upon the level with others, and laziness which hinders us from pursuing our inclinations with vigour and assiduity. Nothing then remains but that the envious man endeavour to stop those, by some artifice, whom he will not strive to overtake, and reduce his superiours to his own meanness, since he cannot rise to their elevation.9 To this end he examines their conduct with a resolution to condemn it; and, if he can find no remarkable defects, makes no scruple to aggravate smaller errours, ’till, by adding one vice to another, and detracting from their virtues by degrees, he has divested them of that reputation which obscured his own, and left them no qualities to be admired or rewarded.

Calumnies are sometimes the offspring of resentment. When a man is opposed in a design which he cannot justify, and defeated in the prosecution of schemes of tyranny, extortion, or oppression, he seldom fails to revenge his overthrow by blackening that integrity which effected it. No rage is more fierce than that of a villain disappointed of those advantages which he has pursued by a long train of wickedness. He has forfeited the esteem of mankind, he has burthened his conscience, and hazarded his future happiness, to no purpose, and has now nothing to hope but the satisfaction of involving those, who have broken his measures, in misfortunes and disgrace. By wretches like these it is no wonder if the vilest arts of detraction are practised without scruple, since both their resentment and their interest direct them to depress those, whose influence and authority will be employed against them.

But what can be said of those who, without being impelled by any violence of passion, without having received any injury or provocation, and without any motives of interest, vilify the deserving and the worthless without distinction; and, merely to gratify the levity of temper and incontinence of tongue, throw out aspersions equally dangerous with those of virulence and enmity?1

These always reckon themselves, and are commonly reckoned by those whose gaiety they promote, among the benevolent, the candid, and the humane; men without gall or malignity, friends to good-humour, and lovers of a jest. But, upon a more serious estimation, will they not be, with far greater propriety, classed with the cruel and the selfish, wretches that feel no anguish at sacrificing the happiness of mankind to the lowest views, to the poor ambition of excelling in scurrility? To deserve the exalted character of humanity and good-nature, a man must mean well; it is not sufficient to mean nothing. He must act and think with generous views, not with a total disregard of all the consequences of his behaviour. Otherwise, with all his wit and all his laughter, what character can he deserve, but that of “the fool, who scatters fire-brands, arrows, and death, and says, am I not in sport?”2

The consequences of this crime, whatever be the inducement to commit it, are equally pernicious. He that attacks the reputation of another, invades the most valuable part of his property, and perhaps the only part which he can call his own. Calumny can take away what is out of the reach of tyranny and usurpation, and what may enable the sufferer to repair the injuries received from the hand of oppression. The persecutions of power may injure the fortune of a good man; but those of calumny must complete his ruin.

Nothing can so much obstruct the progress of virtue, as the defamation of those that excel in it. For praise is one motive, even in the best minds, to superiour and distinguishing degrees of goodness; and therefore he that reduces all men to the same state of infamy, at least deprives them of one reward which is due to merit, and takes away one incitement to it. But the effect does not terminate here. Calumny destroys that influence, and power of example, which operates much more forcibly upon the minds of men, than the solemnity of laws, or the fear of punishment. Our natural and real power is very small; and it is by the ascendant3 which he has gained, and the esteem in which he is held, that any man is able to govern others, to maintain order in society, or to perform any important service to mankind, to which the united endeavours of numbers are required.4 This ascendant, which, when conferred upon bad men by superiority of riches, or hereditary honour, is frequently made use of to corrupt and deprave the world, to justify debauchery, and shelter villainy, might be employed, if it were to be obtained only by desert, to the noblest purposes. It might discountenance vanity and folly; it might make the fashion cooperate with the laws, and reform those upon whom reason and conviction have no force.

Calumny differs from most other injuries in this dreadful circumstance. He who commits it, never can repair it. A false report may spread, where a recantation never reaches; and an accusation must certainly fly faster than a defence, while the greater part of mankind are base and wicked. The effects of a false report cannot be determined, or circumscribed. It may check a hero in his attempts for the promotion of the happiness of his country, or a saint in his endeavours for the propagation of truth.

Since therefore this sin is so destructive to mankind, and, by consequence, so detestable in the sight of God, it is necessary that we enquire, Thirdly, what reflections may best enable us to avoid it.

The way to avoid effects is to avoid the causes. Whoever therefore would not be tempted “to bear false witness,” must endeavour to suppress those passions which may incite him to it. Let the envious man consider, that by detracting from the character of others, he in reality adds nothing to his own; and the malicious man, that nothing is more inconsistent with every law of God, and institution of men, than implacability and revenge.

If men would spend more time in examining their own lives, and inspecting their own characters, they would have less leisure, and less inclination, to remark with severity upon others. They would easily discover, that it will not be for their advantage to exasperate their neighbour, and that a scandalous falsehood may be easily revenged by a reproachful truth.

It was determined by our blessed Saviour, in a case of open and uncontested guilt, that “he who was without fault,” should “cast the first stone.”5 This seems intended to teach us compassion even to the failings of bad men; and certainly that religion which extends so much indulgence to the bad, as to restrain us from the utmost rigour of punishment, cannot be doubted to require that the good should be exempted from calumny and reproach.

Let it be always remembered, that charity is the height of religious excellence; and that it is one of the characteristicks of this virtue, that it “thinketh no ill of others!”6