When such is the condition of beings, not brute and savage, but endowed with reason, and united in society, who would not expect that they should join in a perpetual confederacy against the certain, or fortuitous, troubles to which they are exposed? that they should universally co-operate in the promotion of universal felicity? that every man should easily discover that his own happiness is connected with that of every other man? that thousands and millions should continue together, as partakers of one common nature? and that every eye should be vigilant, and every hand active, for the confirmation of ease, and the prevention of misfortune?

This expectation might be formed by speculative wisdom, but experience will soon dissipate the pleasing illusion. A slight survey of life will shew that, instead of hoping to be happy in the general felicity, every man pursues a private and independent interest, proposes to himself some peculiar convenience, and prizes it more, as it is less attainable by others.6

When the ties of society are thus broken, and the general good of mankind is subdivided into the separate advantages of individuals, it must necessarily happen, that many will desire what few can possess, and consequently, that some will be fortunate by the disappointment, or defeat, of others; and since no man suffers disappointment without pain, that one must become miserable by another’s happiness.

This is however the natural condition of human life. As it is not possible for a being, necessitous and insufficient as man, to act wholly without regard to his interest, so it is difficult for him to place his interest at such a distance from him, as to act, with constant and uniform diligence, in hopes only of happiness flowing back upon him in its circulation through a whole community, to seek his own good, only by seeking the good of all others, of many whom he cannot know, and of many whom he cannot love. Such a diffusion of interest, such sublimation of self-love is to all difficult, because it so places the end at a great distance from the endeavour; it is to many impossible, because to many the end, thus removed, will be out of sight.7 And so great are the numbers of those whose views either nature has bounded, or corruption has contracted, that whoever labours only for the publick, will soon be left to labour alone, and driven from his attention to the universe, which his single care will very little benefit, to the inspection of his own business, and the prosecution of his private wishes. Every man has, in the present state of things, wants which cannot wait for publick plenty, and vexations which must be quieted before the days of universal peace. And no man can live only for others, unless he could persuade others to live only for him.8

The misery of the world, therefore, so far as it arises from the inequality of conditions, is incurable. There are desires, which almost all feel, but which all cannot gratify. Every man may, without a crime, study his own happiness, if he be careful not to impede, by design, the happiness of others. In the race of life, some must gain the prize, and others must lose it; but the prize is honestly gained by him who outruns his competitor, without endeavouring to overthrow him.9

In the prosecution of private interest, which Providence has either ordained, or permitted, there must necessarily be some kind of strife. Where blessings are thrown before us, as the reward of industry, there must be a constant struggle of emulation. But this strife would be without confusion, if it were regulated by reason and religion, if men would endeavour after lawful ends by lawful means.

But as there is a laudable desire of meliorating the condition of life, which communities may not only allow, but encourage, as the parent of useful arts, by which first necessity was supplied, and conveniences will always be multiplied; as there is likewise an honest contention for preference and superiority, by which the powers of greater minds are pushed into action, and the antient boundaries of science are overpast, so there is likewise a strife, of a pernicious and destructive kind, which daily disturbs the quiet of individuals, and too frequently obstructs, or disturbs, the happiness of nations; a strife which always terminates in confusion, and which it is therefore every man’s duty to avoid himself, and every man’s interest to repress in others.

This “strife,” of which cometh “confusion,” the Apostle has, in his prohibition, joined with envying. And daily experience will prove, that he has joined them with great propriety; for perhaps there has seldom been any great and lasting strife in the world, of which envy was not either the original motive, or the most forcible incentive.1 The ravages of religious enthusiasts, and the wars kindled by difference of opinions, may perhaps be considered as calamities, which cannot properly be imputed to envy; yet even these may often be justly suspected of rising from no higher, or nobler causes. A man convinced of the truth of his own tenets, wishing the happiness of others, and considering happiness as the certain consequence of truth, is necessarily prompted to extend his opinions, and to fill the world with proselytes. But surely pure zeal cannot carry him beyond warm dispute, and earnest exhortation; because by dispute and exhortation alone can real proselytes be made. Violence may extort confession from the tongue, but the mind must remain unchanged. Opinion, whether false or true, whether founded on evidence, or raised by prejudice, stands equally unshaken in the tempests of commotion, and sets at defiance the flames of hostility, and the sword of persecution.2

No man, whose reason is not darkened by some inordinate perturbation of mind, can possibly judge so absurdly of beings, partakers of the same nature with himself, as to imagine that any opinion can be recommended by cruelty and mischief, or that he, who cannot perceive the force of argument, will be more efficaciously instructed by penalties and tortures. The power of punishment is to silence, not to confute. It, therefore, can never serve for the effectual propagation, or obstruction, of doctrines. It may indeed sometimes hinder the dissemination of falsehood, and check the progress of errour, but can never promote the reception of truth.

Whenever, therefore, we find the teacher, jealous of the honour of his sect, and apparently more sollicitous to see his opinions established than approved, we may conclude, that he has added envy to his zeal; and that he feels more pain from the want of victory, than pleasure from the enjoyment of truth.

It is the present mode of speculation to charge these men with total hypocrisy, as wretches who have no other design but that of temporal advancement, and consider religion only as one of the means by which power is gained, or wealth accumulated. But this charge, whatever may have been the depravity of single persons, is by no means generally true. The persecutor and enthusiast have often been superiour to the desire of worldly possessions, or, at least, have been abstracted from it by stronger passions. There is a kind of mercantile speculation, which ascribes every action to interest, and considers interest as only another name for pecuniary advantage.3 But the boundless variety of human affections is not to be thus easily circumscribed. Causes and effects, motives and actions, are complicated and diversified without end. Many men make party subservient to personal purposes; and many likewise suffer all private considerations to be absorbed and lost in their zeal for some publick cause. But envy still operates, however various in its appearance, however disguised by specious pretences, or however removed from notice by intermediate causes.4 All violence, beyond the necessity of self-defence, is incited by the desire of humbling the opponents,5 and, whenever it is applied to the decision of religious questions, aims at conquest, rather than conversion.

Since, therefore, envy is found to operate so often, and so secretly, and the “strife” which arises from it is certain to end in “confusion,” it is surely the duty of every man, who desires the prosperity of his country, as connected with a particular community, or the general happiness of the world, as allied to general humanity,

First, to consider, by what tokens he may discover in himself, or others, that “strife” which springs from “envy,” and ends in “confusion.”

Secondly, what are the evils, produced by that “confusion,” which proceeds from “strife.”

First, let us consider, by what tokens we may discover in ourselves, or others, that “strife” which springs from “envy,” and ends in “confusion.”

That strife may well be supposed to proceed from some corrupt passion, which is carried on with vehemence, disproportioned to the importance of the end openly proposed. Men naturally value ease and tranquillity at a very high rate, and will not, on very small causes, either suffer labour,6 or excite opposition. When, therefore, any man voluntarily engages in tasks of difficulty, and incurs danger, or suffers hardships, it must be imagined that he proposes to himself some reward, more than equivalent to the comforts which he thus resigns, and of which he seems to triumph in the resignation; and if it cannot be found, that his labours tend to the advancement of some end, worthy of so much assiduity, he may justly be supposed to have formed to himself some imaginary interest, and to seek his gratification, not in that which he himself gains, but which another loses.

It is a token that strife proceeds from unlawful motives, when it is prosecuted by unlawful means. He that seeks only the right, and only for the sake of right, will not easily suffer himself to be transported beyond the just and allowed methods of attaining it. To do evil that good may come,7 can never be the purpose of a man who has not perverted his morality by some false principle; and false principles are not so often collected by the judgement, as snatched up by the passions. The man whose duty gives way to his convenience, who, when once he has fixed his eye upon a distant end, hastens to it by violence over forbidden ground, or creeps on towards it through the crooked paths of fraud and stratagem, as he has evidently some other guide than the word of God, must be supposed to have likewise some other purpose than the glory of God, or the benefit of man.

The evidence of corrupt designs is much strengthened, when unlawful means are used, in preference to those which are recommended by reason, and warranted by justice.

When that which would have been granted to request, or yielded to remonstrance, is wantonly seized by sudden violence, it is apparent that violence is chosen for its own sake, and that the claimant pleases himself, not with the possession, but the power by which it was gained, and the mortification of him, to whom his superiority has not allowed the happiness of choice, but has at once taken from him the honour of keeping, and the credit of resigning.

There is another token that strife is produced by the predominance of some vicious passion, when it is carried on against natural, or legal, superiority. This token, though perhaps it is not very frequently fallacious, is not equally certain with the former; because that superiority which nature gives, or institutions establish, too frequently incites insolence, or oppression; such insolence as may justly be restrained, and such oppression as may be lawfully resisted. Many modes of tyranny have been practised in the world, of which it is more natural to ask, with wonder, why they were submitted to so long, than why they were at last opposed and quelled. But if history and experience inform us that power and greatness grow wanton and licentious, that wealth and prosperity elate the mind, and enslave the understanding to desire, and when men once find that no one has power to controul them, they are seldom very attentive to justice, or very careful to controul themselves: history and experience will likewise shew us, that the contrary condition has its temptations and its crimes, that he who considers himself as subject to another, and liable to suffer by caprice or wickedness, often anticipates the evils of his state, imagines himself to feel what he only fears, and imputes every failure of negligence, or start of passion, to studied tyranny and settled malevolence. To be inferiour is necessarily unpleasing, to be placed in a state of inferiority to those who have no eminent abilities, or transcendent merit, (which must happen in all political constitutions) increases the uneasiness; and every man finds in himself a strong inclination to throw down from their elevated state those whom he obeys without approbation, whom he reverences without esteem. When the passions are once in motion, they are not easily appeased, or checked. He that has once concluded it lawful to resist power, when it wants merit, will soon find a want of merit, to justify his resistance of power.

Thus, if we consider the conduct of individuals towards each other, we shall commonly find the labourer murmuring at him who seems to live by easier means. We shall hear the poor repining that others are rich, and even the rich speaking with malignity of those who are still richer than themselves.

And if we survey the condition of kingdoms and commonwealths, it will always be observed, that governours are censured, that every mischief of chance is imputed to ill designs, and that nothing can persuade mankind, that they are not injured by an administration, either unskilful, or corrupt. It is very difficult always to do right. To seem always to do right to those who desire to discover wrong, is scarcely possible. Every man is ready to form expectations in his own favour, such as never can be gratified, and which will yet raise complaints, if they are disappointed.8

Such is commonly the disposition, with which men look upon those who are placed above them, and with such dispositions we cannot hope that they should be often pleased. Life is a state of imperfection, and yet every man exacts from his superiours consummate wisdom, and unfailing virtue.9 And whenever he sees, or believes himself to see, either vice or errour, thinks himself at liberty to loosen the ties of duty, and pass the boundaries of subordination, without considering that of such “strife” there must come “confusion,” or without knowing, what we shall consider,

Secondly, the evils and mischiefs produced by that “confusion” which arises from “strife.”

That the destruction of order, and the abolition of stated regulations, must fill the world with uncertainty, distraction, and sollicitude, is apparent, without any long deduction of argument. Yet it has too frequently happened, that those who either feel their wishes restrained, see their fortunes wearing away, or imagine their merit neglected, and their abilities employed upon business unworthy of their attention, desire times of tumult and disturbance, as affording the fairest opportunities for the active and sagacious to distinguish themselves, and as throwing open the avenues of wealth and honour, to be entered by those who have the greatest quickness of discernment, and celerity of dispatch. In times of peace every thing proceeds in a train of regularity, and there is no sudden advantage to be snatched, nor any unusual change of condition to be hoped. But when sedition and uproar have once silenced law, and confounded property, then is the hour when chance begins to predominate in the world, when every man may hope without bounds, and those, who know how to improve the lucky moment, may gain in a day what no length of labour could have procured, without the concurrence of casual advantage.

This is the expectation which makes some hasten on confusion, and others look with concern at its approach. But what is this other than gaining by universal misery, supplying by force the want of right, and rising to sudden elevation, by the sudden downfal of others?1

The great benefit of society is that the weak are protected against the strong. The great evil of confusion is that the world is thrown into the hands, not of the best, but of the strongest; that all certainty of possession or acquisition is destroyed; that every man’s care is confined to his own interest, and that general negligence of the general good makes way for general licentiousness.

Of the strife,2 which this day brings back to our remembrance, we may observe, that it had all the tokens of “strife” proceeding from “envy.” The rage of the faction, which invaded the rights of the church and monarchy, was disproportionate to the provocation received. The violence, with which hostility was prosecuted, was more than the cause, that was publickly avowed, could incite or justify. Personal resentment was apparent in the persecution of particular men, and the bitterness of faction broke out in all the debates upon publick questions. No securities could quiet suspicion, no concessions could satisfy exorbitance. Usurpation was added to usurpation, demand was accumulated on demand; and, when war had decided against loyalty, insult was added to insult, and exaction to exaction.

As the end was unjust, the means likewise were illegal. The power of the faction, commenced by clamour, was promoted by rebellion, and established by murder; by murder of the most atrocious kind, deliberate, contumelious, and cruel; by murder, not necessary even to the safety of those by whom it was committed, but chosen in preference to any other expedient for security.3

This war certainly did not want the third token of “strife” proceeding from “envy.” It was a war of the rabble against their superiours; a war, in which the lowest and basest of the people were encouraged by men a little higher than themselves, to lift their hands against their ecclesiastical and civil governours, and by which those who were grown impatient of obedience, endeavoured to obtain the power of commanding.

This “strife,” as we all know, ended in “confusion.” Our laws were over-ruled, our rights were abolished. The soldier seized upon the property, the fanatick rushed into the church. The usurpers gave way to other usurpers; the schismaticks were thrust out by other schismaticks; the people felt nothing from their masters but alternatives of oppression, and heard nothing from their teachers but varieties of errour.4

Such was the “strife,” and such was the “confusion.” Such are the evils which God sometimes permits to fall upon nations, when they stand secure in their own greatness, and forget their dependence on universal sovereignty, depart from the laws of their Maker, corrupt the purity of his worship, or swerve from the truth of his revelation. Such evils surely we have too much reason to fear again, for we have no right to charge our ancestors with having provoked them by crimes greater than our own.

Let us therefore be warned by the calamities of past ages; and those miseries which are due to our sins, let us avert by our penitence. “Let the wicked forsake his ways, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him, and to our God, and he will abundantly pardon.”5